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ABSTRACT 
This is a report summarizing our progress towards'~ a theory of  cognitive learning. It is con- 
cerned with an algorithm that recognizes, selects and f~rmulates in an internal language 
problems that arise in an external environment. This algorithm revises its representation o f  the 
environment and uses it to cope with self-selected problems. 
The algorithm depends on the formation o f  hypotheses and their use to select actions. 
The key ideas o f  this project are major new addigions to a theory of  representation o f  
knowledge built on an inductive predicate logic. 
1. Introduction 
Algorithms for recognizing problems and formul.~ting corresponding 
problem-statements are of basic interest in both artificial intelligence and 
theoretical behavioral science. How, for example, could a program do 
anything like what Homer Atkins and his Sarkhanese partner Jeepo in 
The Ugly American [18] did when they picked, formulated, and solved the 
problem of developing a man-powered water pump to raise water from one 
terraced ric~ paddy to another under the constraints they imposed. Proven 
techniques for educating people so that they can shift representations-- 
in the above example to cc, nceive of rider + bicycle as a pumping motor 
vthen it is not r.eeded for trarsportation--can havesignificant social 
consequences. 
In this paper we report progress toward the ~evelopment of a research tool 
to investigate algorithms for !earning to recognize and cope with problems 
by the formation and use of representations that are built of hypotheses. 
We call this "cognitive learning". We regard this as a process for utilizing 
experiential inputs to shift representations so that an increasing variety of 
problerf~s can be recognized, formulated, co~d with. 
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The mainstream of activity in artificial intelligence has been directed towards 
making computers more powerful aids to human problem-solving, by 
enabling a computer user to state his problem in programming languages at 
ever higher levels and expecting the computing system to find a solution 
from merely the problem-statement. But the user has to present a well- 
defined problem.statement. Such a statement must specify three sets: 
(1) all possible "solutions"; (2) properties a solution must have; (3) methods 
or knowledge necessary to find a solution. For example, "Find a pair of 
integers (x, y) such that 7x + 5y = 31 using Euclid's algorithm" is a well- 
defined statement; the three sets are (I) all integer pairs, (2) the given equation, 
(3) the name of a method, known to work. 
For a computer to solve the problem in the above example if the problem- 
statement in quotes is presented as input, there must be programs to analyze 
this input sentence both syntactically and semantically. The result of this 
analysis is another program. Running that program generates a solution. 
All this is within the state of the art of advanced computer programming for 
a rather narrow and well defined class of problem statements. To enable a 
computer to deal with any of a large and diverse class of problem-statements 
without considerable readjustment of the stored programs for each problem- 
type is quite another matter. 
Problem-solving in the context of well-defined problem-statements is 
equivalent to linguistic analysis, path-reduction and efficient search. By 
changing the specifications of the 3 sets in the problem-statement while still 
representing the same problem, the search effort to find a solution can be 
greatly reduced [2, 3]. Specifying a reasonably general algorithm that produces 
such shifts of representation is as much of a challenge as it was when the 
"representation problem" [20] was first recognized as central [1 I]. Learning, 
in its deeper sense--what we call cognitive learning--involves shifts in 
representation. 
To conceptualize and advance towards truly general-purpose problem- 
solving algorithms, it is customary to develop techniques which are specific 
to each problem-class and then attempt to synthesize these special techniques 
or to generalize from them. This does not appear to be the only or the most 
attractive way to proceed. Algorithms that enable a computer to learn how 
to analyze and salve a diversity of problem-statements, developed by a 
combination of insight and luck, may be an equally fruitful approach. It 
may even pay to risk the boldest approach of searching fo~" algorithms that 
enable the computer to formulate its own problem-statements as the need 
arises. 
There has been little concern with problems that do not meet these 3 
specifications of well-definedness. Problems that the world creates for people 
do not come as problem-statements, much less as well-defined ,rues. In that 
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respect, real problems differ from those presented verbally by an experimenter 
in a psychological laboratory or by a computer user. We  would expect a 
computer to recognize, select and pose problems by and for itself only if it 
had to function as an autonomous robot. 
The study of such autonomous robots is significant for the theoretical 
foundations of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. The general 
goal of our research is to use such self-instructed robots as a vehicle for 
fundamental theoretical investigations towards conceptualizing and explicat- 
ing cognition and the organization of knowledge. 
In previous works [12, 13~ 14] we distinguished, with logical precision, 
between "information" (in the sense of communication theory) and 
"knowledge". Knowledge differs from information in that it is a property of 
the knower, interpreted by him through an ir~ternal representation system, 
preparing him for action. Cognitive learning involves the acquisition and use 
of knowledge for improved coping performance, for taking increasingly 
effective actions. 
In this paper, we present our plesent conceptualization of cognitive 
learning. This takes the form of an algorithm which forms and uses representa- 
tions. Two aspects of this algorithm, in: greatly simplified form, were 
implemented as operational computer programs to illustrate and to serve as 
a vehicle for research. They are described elsewhere. We first define the kind 
of problem-generating environment in which cognitive learning is to take 
place. We then explicate our notion of a cognitive learner. Both models of 
the environmert and the learner are presented in two stages of increasing 
complexity. 
Our primary concern is to show h~w knowledge can be represented for use 
in recognizing a~d coping with problems. The value of the ideas presented 
here is in their possible stimulation of fellow theorists in artificial intelligence, 
epistemology, a:~?. cognitive psychology to discuss and to further develop 
this line of mode!~ng. 
2. Simple Environments 
We start with the concept of a simple environment E. This is a prerequisite 
to formalizing the notion of a learner L, and, subsequently, complex environ- 
ments. Then we state a central problem about a learning algorithm and a 
result about its incompleteness. The formal definition of E that follows is 
interMed to capture the intuitive notion of a law-governed environment over 
which L has some control, such as a satellite in orbit. 
An informal statement describing the notion of a simple environment 
follows. To specify a simple environment is to specify how the current state 
of the relevant world of some actor co-determines, together with his action, 
the next state of his world. It is also necessary to specify whether this change 
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of*state was a step in the direction of making the actor more viable and 
increasing the "quality of his life", whether it was a step in the or~posite 
direction, or whether it was neither. By viability and quality of life we do not 
mean personal values, but the analogue of criteria for biological and cultural 
survival. For example, a change of state in which the pH of the actor's blood 
increases by a large amount may be in the direction of lower viability, and a 
change of state in which the actor's income is reduced is likely to decrease 
rather than increase the quality of his life in the sense of decreasing his 
options for enjoying the benefits of  his culture. 
We shall use the words "learner" and "actor" interchangeably. Both are 
intended to refer to human beings in their role as information-processors in 
acquiring, organizing, and utilizing knowledge by interaction with their 
environment. Our primary concern is to better understand how nature could 
have evolved such information processors with a view towards helping them 
improve. If we attempt to identify learners and actors as robots or as 
computer programs, it is only to gain conceptual clarity and deductive 
power, as well as to explore the conceptual limits of automata as models for 
human cognitive learning. 
The formal definitions that follow are steps in this more precise explication. 
They are the basis for operational computer programs that generate a general 
class of environments. 
DEFmmON 1. A simple environment E is a six-tuple, {S, R, A, F, s(0), O}, 
where: 
• S is a set (of states), e.g. {I, 2, 3, 4}; 
R is a sex of relations on S, e.g. {{(i, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4)}} ;t 
A is a finite set (of inputs to E),  e.g, {0, 1 }; 
F is a mapping of S x A iz~t.o S, e.g. 
1 2 3 4 current state 
action 1 - - ~ -  --i--- - - ~  ~ next state 
s(0) i~ a particular element of S (initial state), e.g. 1 ; 
O is a partial ordering (or value-function v) on S or S x A (preference, 
utility, survival value), e.g. 4 > 3 > 2 > I, or v(s) - s, s = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
For a physical example, consider the motion of a billiard ball. The set of 
states is the set ofal l  possible positions and speeds of a ball on the surface of 
the billiards table. Any state can be represented as a four-component vector, 
(x, y, vx, vy), where x and y vary from 0 to the length of the table and the v's 
vary up to plus or minus the largest speed a billiard ball can attain. If there 
were two halls, the state can be represented by an 8-component vector, 4 for 
x (s, R) is a relational structure (Bell and Slomson [5l). 
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each ball. Relations between the two balls in any state (i.e. at one time) are 
represented by such predicate-names as "is to the left of". Such a relation is, 
however, an infinite set of ordered pairs of corresponding x-coordinates. 
The set of possible actions in this example is the set of possible forces that 
could be exerted by the billiards player through his cue in hitting a ball. The 
transition function F represents the laws of motion of the ball. Such a law 
has the form: " I f  at time t a ball is in a certain position and moving at a 
certain speed, and the player applies a specified force, then, i~ small time 
increment later, the ball will be at a specified new position and speed." 
More complex versions of such a statement take into account collisions with 
the walls and other balls, and slowing down due to friction. The set of possible 
actions is part of the specification of a simple environment, because it is part 
of the domain of the transition function F. 
What makes such a lawful world an environment is the reference to an 
actor who can select actions and to whom the various states and actions 
make a difference. The partial order on the states of an actor's environment 
represents the varying degrees of viability and quality of the various states. 
If  one state is more viable than another, then the actor "ought" to prefer 
it, if we assume that he is driven by a motivation to survive. Under well-known, 
plaasible conditions regarding the actor's choices, this partial order can be 
replaced by a real-valued utility function. We call this the actor's value 
function; its value represents the utility or value of a state to that actor. 
No two actors need have the same value function, though certain states will 
have greater survival value than specified other states for all actors who 
share the same environment. 
The value function may depend not only on the state, but on the learner's 
action as well, or on just his action. Feedback from the environment consists 
of information about the change of state, and the ordering of the new and the 
old state; the utility of the chenge of state m~.y be interpreted as reinforcement. 
If  the value function depends on the learner's action, we can interpret this as 
a way to reinforce the way that a problem is solved and to attach value to 
elegance. 
The actor is part of a larger world that includes both him and his environ- 
ment. Well-known paradoxes concerning the consistency of choices occur 
when more than one actor participates in this larger world. Such larger 
worlds are no longer the simple environments we are starting with here. 
T~e two essential features of a simple environment are the transition 
function F and the partial order O. The sets S and A are necessary to specify 
the domain of F and O, and the set of relations R is useful in describing the 
s*xucture of a simple environment which is to be left unchanged under 
shifts of representation. 
Had we allowed t to be a real variable, then the transition function could 
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be replaced by a linear differential operator, such as ~ = o  a*dk/dt k, to be 
applied to the state function s(t) and set equal to 0, or more generally, by 
F(s(t), ds/dt, dZs/dt2,. ., t) = O. In that sense E is any environment whose 
"laws of motion" can be described by differential equations, s(0) corresponds 
to initial conditions. Because we have not yet explored E-L  coupling for 
even simple environments, we introduce more complex environments in 
very small o*eps. This is necessary if we are to conceptualize non-trivial 
cognitive ie,,rning, 
In the more realistic, non-physical example of having to raise water from 
one terraced rice paddy to another, the states can be interpreted in one way 
as the presence or absence of water at different levels, and the relations are 
denoted by such terms as "above". The actions correspond to pumping so as 
to effect changes of state, i.e. a flow of water from one level to the next. 
The ordering or value function is such as to favor conditions in which each 
rice paddy has an adequate amount of water to produce a good yield. The 
set of actions must, however, also specify how ~he pumping is to be accom- 
plished. It must allow for the representation of such alternatives as electric 
motors, hand-powered motors, bicycle-powered motors, etc. 
Selecting the appropriate state-variables is a most  critical determinant of 
success in recognizing and coping with problems. In this example, it is 
essential to broaden the notion of state to include an indication of whether a 
given bicycle is used for transportation or to drive a pump, 
The transition function or the partial order (value-function) or both must 
also specify the constraints on feasible solutions. In this example this excluded 
electric motors or important devices manufactured outside Sarkhan. The 
ideal pump was something that was already in widespread use, and which 
could be readily maintained. 
DEFINmOI~ ~ 2. Suppose there exists a value-function v(s), s e S, v a real 
number, such that L is totally ordered. Let a(0, T) = (a(0), a ( 1 ) , . . ,  a(T)) 
and let V(a(O, T), s(0)) - ~ - -o  v(s(t)), where s(t + 1) = F(s(t),a(t)). An 
optimalpath of length T' - T is a sequence a(T + 1, T') for which 
T" T 
V(a(T + 1, T'), s(0)) = ~ v(s(t)) - ~ v(s(t)) 
t = O  t = O  
= max V(a(T + 1, T'), s(O)). 
a(T + 1, T'), s(O) 
A path is limit-optimal if there is a To such that for all T > To, and, for all 
T ~, O(T + 1 , . . . ,  T') is optimal. 
An optimal path is a finite sequence of successive actions that leads to an 
accumulation of utilities to the actor, which is the greatest he could possibly 
• attain. A path is optimal from only the actor's point of view. If  there are 
several actors, there may be several optimal paths. Alternatively, there may 
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be one sequence of  successive actions by each of the actors cooperatively 
which brings a higher accumulation of  utilities to each of  them than would 
paths that are individually optimal. 
Optimal paths are properties of the simple environment. They represent 
upper limits to which any actor could attain if he acts independently of other 
actors. For an action sequence of finite length, such all upper limit always 
exists. It is illustrated in Fig. 1 of Example 1. 
I f  we let the sequence of actions continue indefinitely, we can define upper 
limits to the accumulation of utilities, but these do not always e~st. Under 
reasonable conditions on both the transition function and the value function, 
they usually exist. Examples of  where limits do not exist correspond ~o 
unusual simple environments. 
EXAMPLE 1. In the illustrations placed next to the above definition of E, the 
optimal path is 1, 0 0 0 0 . . .  with the resulting state-sequence 1, 2, 4, 4, 4 . . .  
and V(t) = I + 2 + 4 ( t -  1) = 4t - 1. The path 0 0 0 0 . . .  is plausible. 
I f  the learner tried to pick the action at  t -- 1 which maximized the value of 
the next state, this would be chosen. The resulting skate sequence is 1, 3, 3, 3, 
. . .  with V(t)= 1 + 3 + 3(t - 1) = 3t - 1. This path can switch to the 
optimal path at any time by continuing with action I (3 - ,  1), then 1 (1 ÷ 2), 
then 0, 0, 0 , . . .  (2 - ,  4)(4 --, 4) . . . .  That  is a limit-optimal path. 





0 0 0 
~" I i , I  
1 2 3 4 
~t  
FIG. 1 
EXAMPLE 2. S =  {(x,y,z), x,y, zE {1,2,3, . . .}};  R =  4; A =  S; F =  
F(x,y,z,a) = (x',y',z') = (x + 2, (x/Y + ]) 2, z + 2); s(0) = (2, 1, 1). The 
partial ordering O is specified by the following value function: 
v(s'a) = { 1 otherwise.ifa=(x"Y"Z')' 
In this example, F does not depend on a, but only on s. The utility to the 
actor depends on his current action, which is a prediction of the next state. 
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Thus, if the current state is (4, 4, 3), the next state will be (6, 9, 5). If the 
actor selects as his action the triple (6, 9, 5), the value of his value function 
is 1. For any other action, it is O. 
In this example the actor is assumed to behave in such a way that if he 
predicts correctly, then thi~ increases his chances of survival or of improving 
his lot. The utility function which governs such behavior is as much part of 
the simple environment as is the transition function, even though it might 
seem as if the u~fility function specifies the actor. We regard the utility function 
as similar to the transition function for the "internal", as distinct from the 
external, environment of the actor. 
This simple environment generates a sequence of states such as: 2, 1, 1; 
4, 4, 3; 6, 9, 5; 8, 16, 7; 10, 25, 9; . . . .  Every third number beginning with 
the first, second, third is, respectively, even, a square, odd. 
Many of the tasks used to test AI programs are readily formulated as 
special cases of E. This is also the case for many of the tasks used in psycho- 
logical experiments on problem-solving, such as recognizing the regularity 
in a sequence. 
One advantage of presenting such problems in this formalism is the 
opportunity to train and test the general learning algorithms on them. 
Another advantage is in describing examples of applying the algorithm. 
The main algorithm is specified in the same formalism. The chief advantage, 
however, is the possibility of demonstrating generality, by showing that t~e 
main algorithm can be applied to diverse problems without major readjust- 
taunts to fit each special case. 
Thinking about various specific simple environments has led to a number 
of interestiz,~ new tasks for both artificial intelligence and experiments on 
human problem-formulation and recognition. More important, this con- 
ceptualization of a simple environment captures an interesting class of real 
problem-generating environments. ~ 
The precise description of E is presented as a program in a formal meta- 
language Lo used by the observer-analyst-programmer. In practice this was 
SNOnOL4. Special assignment-statements can both describe the state-transition 
and value functions for E and, when executed, generate the successive 
2 The notion of state space has for long been fruitful in theoretical physics, electrical 
engineering and more recently mathematical economics and biology. Success in solving 
problems, such as the n-body problem for planetary motion by applying global analysis, 
depends critically, however, on the choice of the coordinates of state-space (e.g. total 
energy and angular momentum) (Smale [21, 22]). It is equally easy to replace state-spa~ 
notions by "Petri nets". There, the nodes of a graph which in state-space denote states, 
denote moments of change, as a car moving from one section of the highway to another. 
An edge, which conventionally denotes state.transition, denotes a state, such as a section 
,of highway being occupied or free. In artificial intelligence, it has also been used by several 
authors (e.g. Doran [8]). 
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states of E. Several programs to generate specific E 's  exist; there is one 
rather general program to generate an E with specified properties. 
We view a learner L as a program coupled with E. Its outputs, interpreted 
as actions, correspond to A. They are inputs to E. For simplicity we assume 
that every L and E are all synchronized with a clock which measures time 
as t = 0, 1, 2 , . . .  and with states and actions specified for each t. The inputs 
to L are two successive states of E, plus an indication of whether or not one 
is not preferred by L to the other. ° 
DEFINmON 3. A simple actor L is a seven-tuple {S, O, L, A, M, ~, s*(0)}, 
where: 
S is a finite set (of subjective states), with s*(0)e S (ir itial state), e.g. 
hunger, t h i r s t , . . . ;  
O is a partial order on S (personal preferences), e.g. euphoria > hunger, etc.; 
L is an internal formal language, e.g. group theory 3 may be part of  it; 
A is a finite set (of possible actions, as seen by L), e.g. may be in 1-1 
correspondence with A; 
M is a memory, partitioried into 5 finite sets of cells to be read and written 
on, reserved for storing input% 4 actions and hypotheses; 
is an algorithm which, for each t, (1) selects a e A, (2) forms hypotheses 
and stores them in M, (3) stores inputs and actions in M, (4) selects, tests, 
revises hypotheses in M, (5) determines the next internal state. 
Subjective states resemble states of consciousness more than they resemble 
internal physiological or biochemical states. An actor is motivated by 
preferences among his subjective states. He prefers a state of  satiation to one 
of  hunger. The internal formal language is what enables him to represent his 
environment to himself. Sentences of  that language may refer to exte~ai  
as well as to internal and subjective states. The s~t of actions as seen by the 
actor need not coincide with the set of  actions that are the inputs to his 
environment. Our previous specification of a sirhple environment must be 
expressed in some representation, and if that is not the actor's representation~ 
then A and A* could differ. 
L has a dual nature. It  is an object which is part of L's environment. It is 
also a program, which steers the object. 
Only 0 is the program part of  L. The other 6 items are sets of symbols 
3 Formally, group theory is specified by: (a) a vocabulary consisting of: O, x . .  x , ,  xa, = ,  
+ ,  ( , ) ,  0~, A, A, E, ~ ; Co) 6 formation rules generating an infinite set of well-formed or 
syntactically correct sentences; (c) 5 logical axioms, of any predicate calculus; (d) rules of 
inference for establishing some sentences as logical cor~equences of others; (e) 4 axioms 
for equality; and (f) 3 proper axioms for groups (associativity, identity, inverse). 
4 Each input consists of 3.things. First, there is a received signal corresp, ading to the 
current state of E (or to a ~state-transitie,n). Second, there is a received signal indicating 
whether states are in some relation determined by an n-tuple of R. Third, there is a ,  eceived 
signal indicating whether or not (s, s ' )  ~ 0 (or a value v(s) assigned to state s). 
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initially stored for ~ to use. M is a "scratch-pad" store. For simplicity of 
exposition, assume henceforth that A - A and M is initially empty or cleared. 
Assume also that L is rich enough to include sentences capable of describing 
E. We can interpret S, O, L, A as the content of a read-only memory. We 
view M as a read-write random-access memory with push-down features. 
We borrowed the logician's phrase "formal theory" for L. But the specifica- 
tion of L contains no sentences other than the axioms. L itself is the infinite 
set of possible well-formed sentences. This does not capture the notion of a 
developing theory as inten-led in science and as needed here. 
At any time t, memory M contains 5 data bases. They store past state- 
descriptions, instances of relations, utilities, the past action, and hypotheses. 
We shall denote them by B(t), R(t), U(t), a(t), and H(t), respectively. 
The first, B(t), is a store of past state-descriptions which were registered by 
L as inputs from E, and which are still saved by time t. Not all recorded 
state-descriptions are saved for all time. When an hypothesis refers to a 
state, and that hypothesis has been strongly confirmed, then the record of 
the confirming instances may be erased at some risk. Thus, if in the billiard 
ball example, a ball was in position 5, 3 at time 4, then this may be stored in 
B(t), for t > 4, as long as a record of that state may be useful. 
To explain R(t), consider the example of two billiard balls, with only the 
position coordinates constituting a 4-component state-description. Suppose 
the two balls are at 1, 1 and at 1, 2 at time 4. The same two balls move to 
positions 1, 1 and 2, 2 at time 5. That is, the first ball stays put, and the 
second moves to the right one step. Suppose that the simple environment 
consists of just one relation, < ,  which is such that (1, 1, 1, 2)< (1, 1, 2, 2). 
The relation < is an infinite set of ordered pairs of such quadruples, and 
((1, 1, i, 2), (1, 1, 2, 2)) is an instance, which is recorded in R(t) for t > 5. 
' In this instance, we may name another relation, "is to the left of", and 
apply it to the first and the second billiard balls in that order, which is 
defined by (x, y, u, v) < (x, y, u', v'). Thus, the instance "'Ball 1 is to the 
left of Ball 2 at time 5" is what may be stored in R(t). The third data base, 
U(t), is the past record ef utilities. The fourth one is the last action that was 
taken. The fifth is the most important; it consists of saved hypotheses. 
A typical hypothesis is illustrated by the following sentence: "For all t, the 
next state (1, 1, s3(t + 1), 2) is equal to (1, 1, s3(t) + 1, 2)." The algorithm 
attempts to verify selected hypotheses at certain times. It does this by first 
interpreting the hypothesis, that is, by assigning specific state-references in 
B(t), relations in R(t), a(t), or utilities to the variables in the hypothesis. 
For example, data base B(5) might contain an indi~:ation that s(2) = (1, 1, 1, 2) 
and s(3) = (1, 1, 2, 2). This record of two successive states would confirm 
the above hypothesis. This notion of 0 interpreting an hypothesis corresponds 
to the concept of "interpretation" in the predicate calculus. An hypothesis, 
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interpreted by 0, and verified by the "data" in M is a representation of a unit 
of knowledge. 
Based on a count of the number of such confirmations and refutations, 
each sentence in H(t) is assigned a weight. This varies with t. This weight 
function has the properties of a measure of plausibility or credibility [10, 19]. 
It also takes into account the utility of sentences for selecting actions that can 
drive E into preferred states. 
In discussing the data bases in M, we treated the internal representations of 
states, relations, and actions as if they corresponded exactly to representations 
of E by the analyst. This need not be the case. It is particularly important to 
maintain a distinction between the subjec,tive states of which the actor may 
be aware and of his personal preferences among these states on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, of states of the environment and the environmentally 
determined utility ordering among them. In a ,.ormal, healthy actor, the states 
of the environme:~lt are aggregated into large classes, e.g. all states in which 
nutrition is below a certain level, and these correspond to subjective states, 
e.g. hunger, such that the preference ordering o f  the subjective states co- 
incides with the utility ordering of the environmental states. The distinction 
between the subjective and environmental states, and between information 
stored in an internal representation and some other representation becomes 
important when we want to apply the main algorithm ~ to simulate and 
study ~ertain abnormal conditions. 
: FoJ simplicity, we now assume that there is a many-one (homomorphic) 
mapping of S into S such that the ordering O on S corresponds to the 
ordering O on S. Thus, 0 tries to shift L into internal states of S preferred 
according to O. That is, ~ searches for hypotheses of high weight. These are 
likely to imply the selection of actions that drive E into states of S preferred 
according to L's preference ordering. 
DmNmoN 4. An hypothesis is a statement in H(t) together with an associated 
weight w(t). 
We consider an hypothesis to be revised if its weight is changed by ~. 
An hypothesis is true if it can never be refuted. (It may or may not be a 
theorem; we should call (L, H(t~) a good theory if, along with many true 
hypotheses in H(t) there are proofs within L.) 
DmNrrloN 5. A simple actor L is a simple learner if (a) its actions are a 
limit-optimal path, (b) H(t) contains true hypotheses for all t after the 
optimal path is attained, and (c) the weights for true hypotheses are greater 
than the weights assigned to other hypotheses. 
Psychologists have defined learning very broadly as any behavior in which 
the probability of a "response" increases. Thi~ includes habituation. It could 
not exclude such effects as fatigue or increased entropy in non-living systems. 
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In one implementation of the algorithm ~, an action is chosen with a pcoba- 
• bility proportional to the weight of  the hypothesis in H(t) which is relevant 
to the current state. Thus, the notion of a simple learner fits into the 
psychological conception. 
3. Complex Problem-Generating Environments 
We now res¢~ne our formulation of an environment as one which includes 
simple learners. This is necessary if we are to get beyond simple environments 
to deal with environments that require of L the ability to form and use 
representations of knowledge. Our aim is to formalize the notion of problem- 
recognition and coping in such envi?onments. 
Let i> denote the partial ordering O, interpreted for s />  s' as: state s' is 
not preferred to states. By a path from s to s', we mean a finite sequence of 
actions, a(1), a(2), . . . ,  a(n) such that, for some n, F(s(i), a(i)) = s(t + 1), 
s(0) = s, s(n) = s', i = 1 , . . . ,  n - 1. 
DZFINmON 6. A state s is a problem (or task) for L if (1) L can select at least 
two a's, a, a' ~ A, such that F(s, a) ~ F(s, a'), (2) there exist states s '  and s" 
and a path from s to s' and one from s' to s", and (3) either (a) s' > s and 
s" > s', or (b) s > s' and s' > s". Here, s' > s, if  s' I> s and s' ~ s. 
This is to capture the idea that L has a problem if there is some future state 
of E into which L could drive E which L would either strive to reach or to 
avoid because L "ought" greatly to prefer it to the current state or vice versa. 
That is, a problem for L is either a hidden opportunity or a hidden trap, 
an approach or an avoidance task. 
State 1 in Example 1 is a problem state, because: 
(1) L can select action and action 1. The transition function F(s, a) is such 
that F(I, 0) = 3 and F(I, 1) = 2. 
(2) There are two other states, namely 2 and 4, and there is a path from 
state 1 to state 4 via state 2, namely action 1 followed by action 0. 
(3) The value of  state 4, which is 4, exceeds the value of state 2, which is 2, 
and this, in turn, is greater than the value of state 1, which is 1. 
The purpose of (3) is to distinguish problem-states from ordinary states 
from which there could be a one-step transition to a state of higher value. 
A problena-s~'ate, interpreted as an opportunity, is to offer the possibility of 
change to a considerably more valuable state. We tried to capture this by 
requiring that there be at least two increases in value tor a two step path. 
(2) is to assure that such a considerably more valuable state is attainable. 
(I) is to make sure the actor is faced with a noa-trivial choice. 
So far, we have considered E's in which the state transition function either 
does not depend on L---e.g. F(s) = s- -or  where L can control E completely. 
If a program such as L exists, we can certainly conceive of N "copies" of  
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L. Call them L I , . . . ,  LN. To Sl~cify Li is to specify {Sl, e l ,  Ll, A~, Mi, ~, 
s~(0)} as in Definition 3. Only 0 is, in general, the same for all i. I f  they are 
truly identical copies, then the other 6 objects in the 7-tuples are the same 
also. By copies we mean only that ~ is the same, and at least s*(0) is different. 
We still make the above assumptions about  S~,O~ and At = A; also that Li 
and M~ are the same for all i. By a simple environment E we now mean a 
simple environment in which the set of possible inputs is AN; each input is 
an N-taple corresponding to N simultaneous outputs of  L t ,  . . . .  LN. No 
longer can one learner control E if F depend~ on a - ( a t , . . . , a s ) .  Also the 
input to Lt is now a2, a3,. •. ,  a~ as well as the new state and its utility to L1. 
To make it more interesting, however, we can specify which component,~ of  
the state-vector Lt receives as input. For example, i fN  = 2 end s --- (sl, s2, s3), 
L~ might receive az and st, sz while L2 receives a~, s2 and s3. That part of 
L~'s memory M which stores inputs stores not only its own past actions but 
those of  the other L's as well. 
Definition 6 of a "problem for L~" still applies here, with a, a'  replaced by 
a~, al, except that a path from s to s' is now a sequence of  acts by all N 
learners, (at( t) , . . . ,  as(t)), such that for some to and tl, F(s(t), a t ( t ) , . . . ,  
as(t)) = s(t + 1), s(to) = s, sot) = s', t = to, to + 1 , . . . ,  t~ - 1. "[here are 
problems for L~ which L~ can recognize and solve only by the simultaneous, 
coordinated actions of  L ~ , . . . ,  Ls. A problem recognized by Lt is an internal 
state of L~ which satisfies the conditions of Definition 6 (with t> applying to 
the ordering O rather than O, which we had assumed isomorphic, for 
simplicity). To "solve" such problems, the N learners must either be con- 
trolled by a higher-level coordinator capable of forming the solution or by 
communicating with one another in an external (public, conventionalized) 
language L~. 
DErImTmN 7. The complex environment of L~ in a universe consisting of 
L l , . . . ,  LN, E is (Lz, L ~ , . . . ,  LN, E). 
In the complex environment of Lt ,  L2 has a dual existence. On the one 
hand, it is a program, formally a 7-tuple as in Definition 3. On the other 
hand, it may have attributes which appear as components of  the state-vector 
of E. Like a robot~ Lz appears to Lt as an object specified by position co- 
ordinates, size, etc. In addition, however, Lz produ~s  an action az and sen- 
tences of L¢ which are input to Lt. 
DF_~aTmN 8. Lr copev with a problem in ~ complex environment if (1) Lj 
recognizes it, (2) selects a future state s" to be reached or avoided, (3) selects 
actions which are part of some path from the present state to s ~, (4) generates 
messages to and utilizes messages from Lj, j ~ i, whose coordinated actions 
may be necessary, and (5) succeeds in reaching or avoiding s". 
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4. Representations and Higher Ianuners 
We now revise Definition 3 as follows. First, A, the set of possible actions or 
outputs of L is infinite and consists of (a) the set Le of possible sentences 
(requests, questions, answers) that can be generated by rewrite rules that are 
part of the specification of A, and (b) actions that are generated by 0 as 
compounds of a set of primitive actions. Secondly, 0 can modify L by adding 
new symbols to its vocabulary~ new rules of formation, new axioms and 
postulates and new special rules ofin~erence. Thirdly, 0 can modify S and O. 
If, for example, 0 causes the subjective state of S "pain" to be replaced by 
several states like ',headache", toothache", etc, and if according to O, 
"pleasure" is preferred to"pa in" ,  then 0 causes O to be revised so that 
"pleasure" is preferred to "headache" and to "toothache". 
W e  now specialize all the above sets. S contains only three elements, cor- 
responding to a high reward state, a tranquil state and a disturbed state, s O is 
obvious. L's vocabulary contains a set PFL of primitive predicate--and 
function-names such as EQ(X, I"), PLUS(X, Y) corresponding to = and + 
in the previous example for  group theory, (see footnote 3, p. 207) and 
EVEN(X), interpreted as "x is even", etc. The formation rules of L include, 
for example, the following: 
(a) VHYP -,  If PREDS, then B; 
• (b) PREDS --, EVEN(X); 
(c) B - ,  VAL = FUNCT; 
(d) FUNCT -,  PLUS(X, Y); 
(e) X, Y --, [ 1 [ 2 [ 3 I s ( l )  [ s(2) I t [ FUNCT [ ACT 1. 
An example of an hypothesis formed from just these rules is " I f  EVEN 
(s(1)), then VAL = PLUS(ACT, PLUS(S(1), 2))", interpreted as follows. 
If the first component s t of the state-vector of E is even~ then the utility or 
value of  that state is a number equal to s x + 2 + the numerical input 
representing Us act. This is an example of a "value-hypothesis" (without the 
associated weight). ~ 
Similar rules allow for the formation of an action-hypothesis, which is a 
formal sentence interpreted as "If  the present state is suchthat st - s 2 and s3 
is even and the action selected is 1, then the next state is such that sl - st + 1, 
s ~ -  s2!, s~---s~". A companion hypothesis states ~ that, otherwise, 
(sb s~, s'3) = (st,  s2, s3). This hypothesis without its companion is only 
partially relevant because it does not account for all possible conditions; 
together with its companion, it describes a function f that assigns to each 
5 We often take S to be a vector space. In this example of a 4-dimensional space, the 
x-y  coordinates of two objects, A and B, are given as (XA, YA; XB, Ya). Only states in which 
A and B have the same x-coordinate--are vertically aligned--are reward states. 
6 Here the next-state components are denoted by primes. 
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current state and action a unique next state. The hypothesis is true i f f  is 
equivalent to F. 
DE~NrrloN 9. The 5-tuple (L(t), H(t), B(t), R(t), U(t)) is L's representation of 
E at time t. It is an accurate representation if H(t) contains a true hypothesis 
of higher weight than the other hypotheses. 
Recall that B(t), R(t), U(t) are the data bases against which action hypotheses 
and value-hypotheses are tested. If an hypothesis is sufficiently confirmed and 
not falsified, the confirming data could be erased, at a risk. Moreover, more 
general hypotheses can replace several others that are special cases. In this 
way, optimum use can be made of the limited memory storing H(t), B(t), R(t), 
u(t). 
Shifts of representation can occur at several levels. At the lowest level, 
may effect a significant change in the distribution of weights over an un- 
Changed set of hypotheses in H(t). At a higher level, new hypotheses, possibly 
contradicting existing ones are added. More radical is a new set of entirely 
different hypotheses replacing H(t), but all still within the same L(t). At the 
highest level is a shift in L(t), for example the addition of new funcfio!~s and 
predicates to PFL. 
DPVI~aTION 10. L is a higher learner if the number of problems in its complex 
environment with which it copes varies with time at a rate no smaller than that 
at which such problems arise. 
Can a higher learner cope with any complex environment? Gold [23] 
showed that under certain conditions such a learner will commit the only 
possible error. He also conjectured that there exist trap states which prevent 
the maximum reward rate from being attained. 
If the repertoire, PFL, of primitive predicates and functions is too small 
or weak, then there exist environmental transition functions F that no 
hypothesis in L can represent. Nor could combinations of these primitives 
or even adding a finite number of new predicates ensure that there is no F 
that can then be represented by some hypothesis f. 
But a great variety 7 of interesting environments can be represented. 
To illustrate, reconsider formation rules (d) and (e) introduced at the begin- 
ning of this section, and replace (d) by: FUNCT--, I ID(X)[SQ(X)I 
FC(X) I SC(X) [ NG(X) I PLUS(X, Y) [ MULT(X, Y) I EXP(X, Y), inter- 
preted as x, x 2, x[, x + 1, - x ,  x + y, xy, and xy. Repeated application of 
7 A most remarkable and fundamental result of  Koimogorov and Arnold states that if 
f ( x l ,  . . . .  xn)  is continuous in x l  . . . .  , xn,  it can be expressed as a repeated composition of 
functions of just one or two variables. For 2-valued functions of n 2-valued functions a 
similar result follows from ]~3olean algebra. This makes it reasonable to assume that a 
large class of interesting functions can be obtained by repeated composition of functions 
in a set of rather simple primitives. 
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both rules, especially the rule X ~  EUNCT leads to an infinite set of 
functions obtainable by repeated composition, e.g. SQ(SC(SQ(SC(SQ 
( . . .  (x) . . . ) ) ) .  Some functions, for example, (x + 1) z or SQ(SUC), are 
equivalent to others, e.g. PLUS(SQtX), PLUS(MULT(2, X), SUC(X))). 
For certain sets PFL of primitive functions, the set of all functions obtained 
by composing them can be a group. Composing a pair of composed functions, 
such as SUC(X) and PLUS(X, NCK1)), can be made equal to ID(X). Such a 
statement of equality can be viewed as a transformation rule. This is part of 
L. Determining whether or not two functions in such a group are equivalent 
is the word problem for groups. This is known to be undecidable in general 
(except for special groups). 
Suppose ~ can add new predicates and functions to PFL. Then the set of 
possible environments that can b¢ represented is greatly enriched. Insofar as 
the universal learning algorithm is a finite string of wordsdescribing how to 
select the next action, how to form a new hypothesis, how to test, select, and 
revise hypotheses, and how to select the next internal state--as well as how to 
form new predicates--, it can be represented by another algorithm capable of 
generating such descriptions. The complex environment is characterized in 
part  by this universal learning algorithm because it includes other learners. 
The question then arises whether a universal learning algorithm could 
eventually learn to represent itself. A partial answer is given by Myhill's 
interpretation of the results of Church and GSdel as "our creativity outruns 
our capacity for anticipating the outcome of that creativity" [24]. This seems 
to indicate that there are logical limits to the existence of a universal learning 
algorithm that can learn to represent any complex environment. 
More advanced versions of a higher learner incorporate the ability to form 
hypotheses about his own abilities, particularly his ability to form hypotheses. 
This is our approach to an explication of consciousness. An actor is aware of 
being hungry if he not only has an hypothesis to that effect, but if he has a 
second-order hypothesis about his ability to form, process, abandon, revise 
the hypothesis that he is hungry. 
5. Conclusions 
The conceptualization of cognitive learning we proposed has been useful as 
a research tool. It has helped at least us to formalize and explicate, with 
increasing depth and precision, basic notions such as "problem", "coping", 
"hypotheses", "representation": It led (and was aided by) the design of 
several computer programs which are of great value for testing and stimulat- 
ing ideas. It has led to theorems about certain learning algorithms [25]. 
It stimulated psychological experiments on problem-recognition and shifting 
of representation in children and adults [4, 15, 16]. 
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The ideas and steps towards demonstrating the existence of a general 
learning algorithm provide new ways of  looking at various real phenomena. 
Consider two instances: the skid~row effect and the maintenance of  a 
delusion. 
By the skid-row effect we mean a trapping phenomenon such as encountered 
by an alcoholic whose self-esteem is low. He behaves consistently with this 
hypothesis. His actions--compulsive drinking--have consequences that 
confirm his hypothesis. Our conceptualization enables us to specify a variety 
of  conditions that can bring about and maintain this effect. Failure for the 
ordering on the states of  the external environment to correspor, d with the 
ordering on the internal states is an example. 
A delusion may be viewed as an hypothesis that is used despite its being 
falsified. This may happen if input data relevant to such an hypothesis is 
screened out, or if it is never stored in B(t), or stored but never attended to 
[1,7]. 
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